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Abstract 
This paper investigates the relation between workers’ on-the-job training 
activities and the degree of wage compression in their occupation. With respect 
to general training – as opposed to firm-specific training – human capital 
theory implies that the worker initiates and finances the training when there is a 
negative relationship. A positive relation between general training and wage 
compression, on the other hand, shows that the employer pays for and benefits 
from training. The empirical results show that the intensity of general training 
in Sweden decreases with wage compression. The paper also reveals 
differences between men and women. 
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1 Introduction 
During recent years, workers’ acquisition of skills has obtained increasing 
attention among social scientists and politicians. One question considered is the 
following: What determines the incidence and intensity of general on-the-job 
training?
1 There are basically two competing theories in the economic 
literature: (i) a “supply-side approach” where the workers accept lower wages 
to initiate and finance general training, and (ii) a “demand-side approach” 
where the employer pays for, and benefits from, general training. The former 
approach relies on human-capital theory and the assumption of competitive 
labour markets, while the latter approach is based on human-capital theory 
complemented with institutional considerations and imperfectly competitive 
labour markets. 
According to theory (i), a compressed wage structure with respect to 
workers’ skills will reduce workers’ incentive to invest in general training. On 
the other hand, according to theory (ii), a compressed wage structure could 
increase employers’ incentives to finance general training. In line with this 
latter theory, an occupation characterized by little wage compression could 
produce less general training than another occupation that is characterized by a 
higher degree of wage compression. 
A method to test these conflicting hypothesises is to study the isolated effect 
of wage compression on the incidence and intensity of training. This has 
recently been done on a cross-country level within the European Union, where 
it is found that increasing wage compression seems to stimulate both firm-
specific and general training.
2 The result supports theory (ii), but it is 
inconsistent with theory (i). The present paper presents a similar test within a 
separate country, Sweden, which was not included in the previous studies. 
Using data on training from the Swedish labour force survey and combining 
these data with statistics on wage compressions for 146 occupations, we 
analyse how and to what extent the wage structure influences training. 
                                                      
1 Becker (1962), (1964) introduced the central distinction between general training and specific 
training. The general training is useful for all other employers that would be interested in hiring 
the worker. Specific training, on the other hand, will only affect the worker’s productivity at the 
present workplace. 
2 See Brunello (2002) and Bassanini & Brunello (2003)  
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The Swedish labour market is characterized by a high rate of union density 
and wages that to a large extent are based on collective agreements between 
trade unions and employers’ organisations. This has lead to a relatively high 
degree of wage compression. Compressed wage structures can be found both 
between industry sectors and occupations as well as within occupations. This 
study will focus on the wage compression within occupations. Does wage 
compression within occupations reduce or stimulate on-the-job training on the 
Swedish labour market? 
The current policy debate about how to stimulate life-long learning and 
workers’ acquisition of skills makes it is important to understand the economic 
mechanisms behind training. To be able to design an appropriate policy, it is 
crucial to know why the present training is inefficient. Theory (i) claims that 
workers are credit constrained, and that market imperfections on the capital 
market are preventing workers from financing their human-capital investments 
by loans. The policy solution in this case would be to take steps to release 
workers’ credit-market constraints to stimulate their incentives to finance 
training. Theory (ii), on the other hand, argues that wage rigidities and 
information asymmetries on the labour market create positive external effects 
from training. That is, competing employers will benefit as the workers move 
to new positions in other firms than the ones who financed the training. This 
results in too small investments in staff training by the employers. The policy 
solution in this case would be to encourage employers to organize and finance 
staff training through clubs of providers that are sharing the costs and benefits 
of training. 
The objective of the present study is thus to investigate whether wage 
compression has a positive or a negative effect on training in Sweden. Both the 
incidence and the intensity of training are analysed, and we make a distinction 
between general and firm-specific training. In contrast to earlier studies, we 
find no evidence that wage compression stimulates general training. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents and 
discusses the theoretical background about the relation between wage 
compression and training. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy for testing 
the theoretical predictions. Section 4 reviews the data. The results are analysed 
in section 5. Concluding remarks follow in section 6. 
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2 Theory 
2.1  Perfectly competitive labour markets 
2.1.1 Basic  framework 
Let us assume a perfectly competitive labour market as our point of departure: 
Neither the employer nor the employee can influence the market wage. Both 
parties are risk neutral and have identical information about the workers 
marginal productivity on the workplace. There is free entry and exit of workers. 
Under these assumptions, the standard model of wage setting predicts that 
competition on the labour market will drive the market wage, w, to equal the 
worker’s marginal productivity, f. The equality between w and f implies that 
firms’ profits are equal to zero. 
By introducing on-the-job training into the model, the neo-classical human-
capital analysis presents a theory why wages might deviate from workers’ 
marginal productivity.
3 Training will generate investment costs originating 
from lower worker productivity during training because of reduced time spent 
in production (indirect costs). There will also be expenditures from travel, 
material, course fees, etc. (direct costs). Let us denote the sum of these costs c 
= c(tw, te), where tw and te are the amounts of training chosen by the worker and 
the employer respectively, ∂c/∂ti ≡  c
i > 0, for all ti > 0, ∂
2c/∂ti∂tj > 0 and ∂
2c/∂ti
2 
> 0. In addition, the worker’s expected future marginal productivity will be f(t), 
where t = tw + te, f’ > 0, f’’ < 0, for all t > 0. 
There are two periods: period 1 “during training” and period 2 “after 
training”. In period 1, the worker and the employer decide the amount of 
training and set wages during training. The sharing of training costs is specified 
in the employment contract, but the employer and the worker choose the level 
of training investment non-cooperatively, where both parties base their 
investment-decisions on their expectations about an optimal investment-
decision by the other party.
4, 5 In period 2, the worker’s marginal productivity 
                                                      
3 See Becker (1962), (1964) 
4 The sharing agreement is pending on parties’ willingness to participate in training activities. If 
the employer is not willing to invest in worker training, then the employment contract specifies 
all training costs to be carried by the worker, and vice versa. In cases where both parties want to 
invest in training, the contract specifies a fixed sharing agreement. 
5 The assumption about non-cooperative training investments is reasonable, when considering 
that these investments often are too complicated to be specified in an employment contract. If 
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f(t) is revealed and wages are renegotiated. Furthermore, there is an exogenous 
probability of separation, q in period 2. For simplicity, we assume a zero 
discount rate between period 1 and period 2. 
 
2.1.2  Incidence of training in perfectly competitive labour markets 
Let us first look at the incentives to engage in general training. The worker’s 
productivity after general training increases equally at his present and other 
potential workplaces. We say that the worker’s marginal productivity is f(1) if 
he has received training and f(0) otherwise, where f(1) > f(0) and f(0) ≡  w. The 
worker carries a share of the training costs γc(1), where 0 ≤  γ  ≤ 1. 
Consequently, the worker’s total wage over the two periods will be either w(1) 
= (1 – q)f(1) + qf(1) + w – γc(1) or w(0) = f(0) + w. The employer’s profit will 
be π(1) = (1 – q)[f(1) – f(1)] + f(0) – w + γc(1) – c(1) = – (1 – γ)c(1). The zero 
profit condition implies that γ = 1 and, hence, that the worker has to bear the 
total cost of training, obtaining the net earnings f(1) – c(1). It follows that the 
worker will invest in general training if 
 
f(1) – f(0) ≥  c(1).     (1) 
 
Next, we assume that training is firm-specific. In this case, the worker’s 
productivity after training increases only at his present workplace. As a result, 
both the employer and the employee are exposed to a risk: If the employment 
relation comes to an end, the payoff from the training investment will be lost. 
The employer and the employee will share this risk by sharing the training 
costs and the training payoff. An intuitive explanation goes as follows: Let us 
assume that the employer would pay the training costs. As the market wage w 
is not affected by training, this might seem to be a reasonable assumption. 
However, the worker might quit the firm after training due to unexpectedly 
high realized value of specific capital in an alternative employment, and the 
employer will lose c(1). In order to induce the worker to stay in the firm, the 
employer will want to make a deal with the employee implying that the 
employee pays a share of the costs γc(1) and obtain a share of the revenues, say 
β[f(1) – w], for 0 ≤  β ≤  1. On the other hand, should the worker bear all the 
costs and obtain all the payoffs, so that γ = 1 and β = 1, then the worker, in 
                                                                                                                                 
investments were specified, a court of law would be unable to verify whether or not they had 
carried out the investments as specified by the contract.   
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turn, would lose c(1) in the event he got laid off after training. Thus, by sharing 
the costs and payoffs, the probability that both parties stay in the employment 
relationship after training is maximized.
6 
Let β reflect the worker’s bargaining power when the wage is renegotiated 
after training. In the case of specific training, the worker will obtain w(1) = (1 – 
q){w + β[f(1) – w]} + qw + w – γc(1) = 2w + (1 – q)β[f(1) – w] – γc(1). Since 
total earnings without training over the two periods is w(0) = 2w, the worker 
will participate in specific training if (1 – q)β[f(1) – w]  ≥  γc(1). The 
employer’s profit from specific training, on the other hand, will be π(1) = (1 – 
q){f(1) – w – β[f(1) – w]} + f  – w – (1 – γ)c(1). The participation constraints 
can thus be written 
 
(1 – q)(1 – β)[f(1) – w] ≥  (1 – γ)c(1),    (employer)    (2a) 
(1 – q)β[f(1) – w] ≥  γc(1).   (worker)    (2b) 
 
2.1.3  Intensity of training in perfectly competitive labour markets 
Let us now analyse the chosen intensity of training. In the case of general 
training, only the worker has incentive to invest in general training, and has to 
pay the training costs by himself. A worker that satisfies the participation 
constraint (1) will earn w – c(tw, 0) in period 1, and w(tw) ≡  f(tw) in period 2, 
where tw is the amount of training chosen in period 1. The worker chooses the 
amount of general training that maximizes the present value of (1 – q)w(t) + 




w(tw*,  0).       (3) 
 
As a consequence, tw* is the socially efficient amount of training, since 
perfectly competitive labour markets and general training ensure that w’(t) = 
f’(t). 
In the case of specific training, a worker who satisfies the participation 
constraint (2b) will earn w – γc(tw, te) in period 1, while in period 2 w(t) = w + 
β[f(t) – w] if he stays in the firm, and w if he leaves the firm. The worker 
chooses tw to maximize (1 – q)(w + β[f(t) – w]) + qw + w – γc(tw, te). On the 
other hand, employers who satisfy the participation constraint (2a) will choose 
                                                      
6 A formal proof of this result is provided by Hashimoto (1981).  
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te that maximizes (1 – q)[f(t) – w(t)] + f – w – (1 – γ)c(tw, te), which, by inserting 
the equation for w(t) becomes (1 – q)(1 – β)[f(t) – w] – (1 – γ)c(tw, te). This 
results in the first-order conditions 
 
(1 – q)(1 – β)f’(t) = (1 – γ)c
e(tw, te), (employer)    (4a) 
(1 – q)βf’(t) = γc
w(tw, te).   (worker)    (4b) 
 
In contrast to the case of general training in competitive labour markets (3), the 
worker’s and the employer’s incentives to invest decrease with the probability 
of separation in period 2. In addition, the smaller the share of the increasing 
productivity the worker or employer gets, the lower becomes his level of 
investment. In other words, the renegotiation of contracts in period 2 creates a 
hold-up problem, which results in inefficient investments.
7 
 
2.2 Imperfectly  competitive labour markets 
2.2.1 Wage  compression 
We now turn to an imperfectly competitive labour market. Here the employers 
cannot compete for the employees on equal terms, since various labour market 
imperfections will provide the present employer with some monopsony power.
8 
The worker’s outside options after training, say v(t), will be lower than his 
value of marginal product at the present firm, even in the case of general 
training. And since the worker’s wage w(t) will be based on his outside options 
v(t) there will be rents in the employment relation accruing to the employer, f(t) 
– w(t) > 0. The market imperfections also implies that the workers’ wage after 
general training will not increase as much as their productivity at the firm, f’(t) 
– w’(t) > 0. This is what is referred to as a compressed wage structure.
9 
 
2.2.2  Incidence of training in imperfectly competitive labour markets 
As demonstrated by Acemoglu & Pischke (1999), the presence of a compressed 
wage structure has strong implications for the incentives to invest in general 
                                                      
7 See Malcomson (1997) for a survey on the hold-up problem in labour markets. 
8 The labour market imperfections may, for example, be a result of asymmetric information 
between employers about the workers’ skills (see Chiang & Chiang (1990), Katz & Ziderman 
(1990), Chang & Wang (1996)), complementarities between specific and general skills, (see 
Acemoglu & Pischke (1999), Stevens (1996)) and rigid wage hierarchies within firms 
(Loewenstein & Spletzer (1998), Acemoglu & Pischke (1999)). 
9 See Acemoglu & Pischke (1999).  
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training. Let the worker’s outside possibilities after general training be v(1), 
and without training v(0). The compressed wage structure implies that f(1) – 
f(0) > v(1) – v(0), or more densely written, ∆f – ∆v > 0. The worker’s marginal 
productivity increases faster with training than what his outside options do, 
which creates rents from general training for the employer. The proof in the 
Acemoglu & Pischke model is the following: The worker’s wage in an 
imperfectly competitive labour market will be based on his outside options and 
his bargaining power vis-à-vis the employer. In case of general training, the 
workers expected wage in period 2 will be w2(1) = (1 – q){v(1) + β[f(1) – 
v(1)]} + qv(1). If there is no general training, then the worker’s expected wage 
in period 2 will be w2(0) = (1 – q){v(0) + β[f(0) – v(0)]} + qv(0). The 
employer’s profit in case of general training becomes π(1) = (1 – q)[f(1) – 
w2(1)] + f(0) – w  – (1 – γ)c(1), which, by inserting the equation for w2(1), can 
be rewritten as π(1) = (1 – q)(1 – β)[f(1) – v(1)] – (1 – γ)c(1). By the same 
reasoning, the employer’s profit without training becomes π(0) = (1 – q)(1 – 
β)[f(0) – v(0)]. The employer will invest in general training if π(1) ≥  π(0), 
which results in 
 
(1 – q)(1 – β)[∆f – ∆v] ≥  (1 – γ)c(1).       (5a) 
 
This constraint reveals that in imperfectly competitive labour markets, the 
employer may have incentive to pay for the worker’s general training, and the 
probability that this happens should increase with wage compression. 
The worker wants to participate in general training if w(1) ≥ w(0), which 
results in v(1) – v(0) + (1 – q)β[f(1) – v(1)] – (1 – q)β[f(0) – v(0)] ≥  γc(1), or 
more densely written 
 
∆f  – (∆f  – ∆v) + (1 – q)β[∆f – ∆v] ≥  γc(1).     (5b) 
 
It follows that for q < 1 and β < 1, the worker’s willingness to pay for general 
training decreases with wage compression. 
This model demonstrates that the result obtained for the incidence of 
general training in a perfectly competitive labour market, (1), is a special case 
where ∆f – ∆v = 0. In addition, the model shows that the incidences of firm- 
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specific training in a perfectly competitive labour market, (2a) and (2b), are yet 
other special cases where ∆v = 0 and f(0) = v(0) = w.
10 
 
2.2.3  Intensity of training in imperfectly competitive labour markets 
We finally analyse the intensity of general training for those workers and 
employers that satisfy the participation constraints (5a) and (5b) in the previous 
section.
11 The worker’s outside options is assumed to follow the usual 
conditions for concavity, v’(t) > 0, v’’(t) < 0. Furthermore, to obtain interior 
solutions it is assumed that f’(0) > v’(0) and v’’(t) ≥  f’’(t). As in the previous 
sections, there is an exogenous probability of separation in period 2 equal to q. 
The worker’s wage in period 2 will be set according to w(t) = v(t) + β[f(t) – 
v(t)]. An employer who satisfies the participation constraint (5a) will choose te 
in period 1 that maximizes (1 – q)[f(t) – w(t)] + f – w – (1 – γ)c(tw, te), which 
results in the first-order condition 
 
(1 – q)(1 – β)[f’(t) – v’(t)] = (1 – γ)c
e(tw, te).      (6a) 
 
This condition shows that the employer’s optimal investment in general 
training should increase with raising wage compression f’(t) – v’(t). A higher 
probability of separation in period 2 (q) and a stronger bargaining position for 
the worker (β) decreases the employer’s investments, while more training costs 
allocated to the worker (γ) increases the employer’s investments. 
A worker that satisfies the participation constraint (5b) will choose tw in 
period 1 that maximizes (1 – q)w(t) + qv(t) + w – γc(tw, te) = (1 – q){v(t) + β[f(t) 
– v(t)]} + qv(t) + w – γc(tw, te). The first-order condition becomes 
 
f’(t) – [f’(t) – v’(t)] + (1 – q)β[f’(t) – v’(t)] = γc
w(tw, te).     (6b) 
 
More wage compression has a positive effect on training through the third term 
on the left-hand side, since the worker can bargain for a greater surplus. 
However, more wage compression decreases the second term, which reflects 
the marginal effect of training on the worker’s outside options. Thus, the total 
                                                      
10 Intuitively, specific training is an extreme case of monopsony and imperfect labour markets. 
Consequently, the participation constraint for specific training in imperfectly competitive labour 
markets coincides with (2a) and (2b). 
11 The intensity of specific training coincides with specific training in perfectly competitive 
labour markets (4a) and (4b).     
IFAU – The effects of wage compression on training: Swedish empirical evidence  11 
effect of more wage compression should be less investment in general training 
by the worker. A lower probability of separation (q) and a stronger bargaining 
position for the worker (β) increases the worker’s investments. 
 
2.3 Summary 
Competitive labour market theory suggests that the worker is the sole investor 
of general training. This view has been challenged by imperfectly competitive 
labour market theory, which puts forward that the employer benefits from 
general training because of wage compression. Both the probability that the 
employer participates in general training investments and the intensity of these 
investments will increase with wage compression. Increasing incidence and 
intensity of general training with wage compression indicate that employers are 
financing general training. 
Should the worker bear some of the training costs through a lower wage 
during training, total general training investments may both increase and 
decrease with wage compression, since the worker’s incentive to invest 
decreases with wage compression. 
Specific training can be regarded as a special case of extreme wage 
compression, where training does not influence the market wage at all, so that 
∆f – ∆v = ∆f. The employer and the worker are sharing the costs and benefits of 
specific training, and the wage structure is dependent on the parties bargaining 
power after training and their share of the training costs during training. 
 
 
3 Empirical  strategy 
The theoretical discussion in the previous section can be summarized by two 
propositions: 
 
Proposition 1: The worker bears the costs of general training, because wage 
compression has a negative effect on the incidence and intensity of general 
training, which is greater than the corresponding effect on specific training 
when training costs are shared between the worker and the employer. 
 
Proposition 2: The employer bears the costs of general training, because wage 
compression has a positive effect on the incidence and intensity of general  
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training, which is greater than the corresponding effect on specific training 
when training costs are shared between the worker and the employer. 
 
By investigating whether wage compression has a positive or a negative effect 
on general training, and compare with the effect on specific training, we will be 
able to test whether the worker or the employer bears the costs of general 
training. 
 
3.1  The incidence of training 
The first step in the empirical analysis is to investigate how wage compression 
influences the incidence of training. When employers bear the total costs of 
general training (γ = 0), equation (5a) states that increasing wage compression 
increases the probability that training takes place. When the workers bear the 
total costs of general training (γ = 1), equation (5b) states that wage 
compression has a negative effect on the probability that training takes place. 
When employers and workers are sharing the costs of general training (0 < γ < 
1), then wage compression has an ambiguous effect on the probability that both 
(5a) and (5a) are satisfied and that training takes place. In the case of specific 
training, by (2a) and (2b), wage compression increases the probability that 
training take place when employers and workers are sharing the costs of 
training (0 < γ < 1).
12 
To measure wage compression, ∆f – ∆v, we need to know both workers’ 
changing productivity from participation in training, ∆f, and workers’ changing 
outside options ∆v. However, such data are not available in Sweden. Only 
information on workers’ participation in training and estimates of the training 
wage premium ∆w = w(1) – w(0) are presently available. Consequently, we 
will treat the productivity gain from training ∆f as an omitted variable and draw 
conclusions about the relation between wage compression and training on the 
basis of the worker’s training wage premium ∆w. 
As pointed out by Bassanini & Brunello (2003), individual productivities 
and wage premia are positively correlated. As a result, the omission of 
increasing individual productivity in the data should bias our estimates to find a 
positive relation between wage premium and training. Hence, the estimates can 
                                                      
12 Note that in case of specific training the concept of wage compression is simply the worker’s 
increasing productivity after training ∆f, since ∆v = 0.  
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be interpreted as a lower bound estimate of the positive impact of wage 
compression on employer sponsored training.
13 
By writing ∆w = (1 – q)β∆f – γc(1) for specific training and ∆w = ∆v + (1 – 
q)β[∆f – ∆v] – γc(1) for general training, and inserting ∆w in (2a), (2b), (5a) 
and (5b), we obtain the following participation constraints: 
 
(1 – q)∆f + q∆v – ∆w ≥  c(1),   (employer; general training) 
(1 – q)∆f – ∆w ≥  c(1),    (employer; specific training) 
 
∆w ≥  0.       (worker) 
 
If the worker bears the costs of training alone, then only the worker’s 
participation constraint is satisfied, implying that ∆w has a positive effect on 
training incidence. Conversely, if the employer bears the costs of training 
alone, then only the employer’s participation constraint is satisfied, and ∆w has 
a negative effect on training incidence. When the employer and the worker are 
sharing the costs of training, both participation constraints above have to be 
satisfied, which leads to an ambiguous effect of ∆w on the probability that 
training take place. A positive relation between ∆w and training incidence thus 
rule out the employer as the sole investor in training, while a negative relation 
between ∆w and training incidence exclude the worker as a single financier of 
training. 
Let us define W as a measure of the training wage premium. Next, we define 
a dummy variable T for individual i. Let T be equal to 1 if the individual has 
obtained training, and 0 otherwise. The empirical relation between W and T can 
be specified as 
 
Ti = α + Xiβ + Jiγ + δki + ηgi + λWi + εi,     (7) 
 
where  Xi is a vector of individual background variables (including age, 
schooling, experience, tenure, etc.), Ji is a vector of occupation dummies, ki is a 
gender dummy, gi is a dummy for occupation in the public sector, and εi is the 
                                                      
13 If ∆f increases with ∆w, then actual wage compression decreases less than what is indicated by 
the increasing ∆w. As a consequence, if it is found that increasing ∆w leads to increasing training 
incidence, then wage compression could have a less negative, or even positive, effect on training 
incidence.  
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error term. X captures individual properties that might influence quit rates (q), 
bargaining power (β), individual productivity (f) and training costs (c).  J 
captures effects on the incidence of training from the various tasks and 
qualifications that are required in different occupations. k catches possible 
differences between men and women, and g captures structural differences in 
training in the private sector and in the public sector. Conditional on these 
variables, λ should reflect the isolated effects of the training wage premium on 
the incidence of training. 
Following Brunello (2002) and Almeida-Santos & Mumford (2004), the 
training wage premium W is measured by wage inequality, using the log of the 
ratio of the 90
th percentile wage to the 10
th percentile wage [log(90
th/10
th)] for 
workers with gender k in occupation J, and in public or private sector.
14 In 
order to analyse the upper and lower wage distribution separately, we will also 
use the 90
th/50
th-percentage wage ratios and the 50
th/10
th-percentage wage 
ratios. With these specifications, a higher value of W  implies more wage 
inequality, a higher wage premium from training, and consequently lower wage 
compression for the workers in the particular occupation, sector and gender. 
Thus, a negative estimate of λ indicates that wage compression stimulates the 
incidence of training. 
It has been pointed out by Booth & Zoega (2004) that ∆f – ∆v should be 
called absolute wage compression, in order to make a distinction to relative 
wage compression which is defined as ∆f / ∆v. They demonstrate that it is 
possible for absolute wage compression to rise without an increase in relative 
wage compression, while increased relative wage compression implies 
increased absolute wage compression. To check if this influences our results in 
the empirical section, we will compare our relative wage compression 





3.2  The intensity of training 
In the second step of the analysis, we investigate how our chosen measure of 
wage compression influences the intensity of training for those workers who 
obtained training in (7). 
                                                      
14 Brunello (2002) also distinguishes between age groups. Separation between ages, however, 
was not available in the data that was used in the present study.  
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By the theoretical model, the second-period wage is set according to w(t) = 
w + β [f(t) – w] in the case of specific training, and w(t) = v(t) + β[f(t) – v(t)] in 
the case of general training. Differentiating and inserting these equations in 
(4a), (4b), (6a) and (6b) results in the following first-order conditions for 
optimal investments in training in period 1: 
 
(1 – q)[f’(t) – w’(t)] = (1 – γ)c
e(tw, te) (employer) 
 
(1 – q)w’(t) + qv’(t) = γc
w(tw, te)  (worker; general training) 
(1 – q)w’(t) = γc
w(tw, te)    (worker; specific training) 
 
These first-order conditions demonstrate that the intensity of employer-
financed general training (γ = 0) increases with wage compression, and, 
consequently, decreases with w’(t). On the other hand, the intensity of worker-
financed general training (γ = 1) increases with w’(t). When employers and 
workers are sharing the costs of general training (0 < γ < 1), then w’(t) has an 
ambiguous effect on the intensity of general training, since w’(t) has opposite 
effects for the employer and the worker. In the case of specific training, the 
employer and the worker also share the cost of training (0 < γ < 1) and the 
effect of w’(t) on the intensity of training is ambiguous. 
In the empirical model, we use our earlier measure of the wage premium, W, 
as an indicator on the rate of increasing wage after training w’(t): 
 
ti = α + Xiβ + Jiγ + δki + ηgi + θGi + κSi + (λGGi + λBBi + λSSi)Wi + ui, (8) 
 
where t is a strictly positive and continuous variable, Gi = 1 if the worker 
obtained  mainly general training and zero otherwise, Si = 1 if the worker 
obtained mainly specific training and zero otherwise, and Bi = 1 if the worker 
obtained partly general and partly specific training and zero otherwise. This 
model allows us to test Proposition 1 that was formulated in the beginning of 
this section: If λG > 0 and λG > λB > λS, then wage compression does have a 
negative effect on general training per se, and Proposition 1 cannot be rejected. 
Similarly, it allows us to test Proposition 2: If it is found that λG < 0, or if λS > 
λB > λG > 0, then wage compression does have a positive effect on general 
training per se, and Proposition 2 cannot be rejected. 
There is a potential selection problem in equation (8). The sample of 
individuals with positive observations on t is dependent on the selection  
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process in (7). That is, t is only observed when T = 1. It follows that equation 
(8) has an incidental truncation that will produce inconsistent parameter 
estimates.
15 It is possible that unobservable variables in εi, which influence the 
training incidence positively or negatively, also are included in ui and influence 
the intensity of training. For example, unobserved worker behaviour and 
motivation may influence the selection process as well as the intensity of 
training for the workers who receive training. To test if this is a problem, the 
Heckman’s two-step estimation procedure will be compared with the OLS 
estimates on (8) in the empirical section. 
Furthermore, there is a potential problem with endogenous independent 
variables in (7) and (8). The wage inequality W might be affected by the 
workers’ participation in training, since workers’ wages should be dependent 
on training incidence and training intensity. As a consequence, the error terms 
in (7) and (8) might be correlated with W, which would produce biased 
estimates on λ. However, we should keep in mind that our data on workers’ 
wage inequalities are not based on individual observations. Therefore, workers’ 
individual participation in training cannot influence W in the same way as it 
might influence workers’ individual wages. The theoretical model, on the other 
hand, predicts that workers’ and employers’ observation of the aggregated 
wage structure will affect their training decisions. 
As a precautionary measure for this potential problem, the data on wage 
inequality will be lagged one year relative to the year of training incidence and 
training intensity. In that way, training cannot have a direct effect on observed 
wage structure. Furthermore, Appendix A tests if the lagged wage inequality is 
exogenous to the training intensity in (8). We assume that Wit is an endogenous 
explanatory variable in (8), and use Wit-1 and Wit+2 as instrumental variables for 
Wit in a 2SLS estimation. The Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions 
cannot reject the hypothesis that Wit-1 is a valid instrumental variable for Wit, 




                                                      
15 See Heckman (1979) 
16 Wt+2 is the latest observations on wage inequalities (year 2003). An alternative strategy would 
be to use Wt-2 as the additional instrumental variable. However, compatible occupational data 
were not available for the year 1999.    
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4 The  data 
The data on training incidence and training intensity come from the 2001 Staff 
training supplement to the Labour force survey, which was conducted by 
Statistics Sweden. The Labour force survey collects a broad range of data on 
working conditions and individual characteristics. The supplementary training 
survey is conducted twice a year, consisting of a rotating panel where the 
sample is the same during one year and 1/3 remains in the sample during two 
years.
17 The sample size is around 13,000 individuals between 16 and 64 years 
of age who are registered to be living in Sweden and participating in the labour 
force. The response rate for these individuals was about 80 percent, resulting in 
a sample of about 10,000 individuals. The number of individuals who had a job 
at the time of the interview was around 7,000. 
The individuals were asked the following question: “During the last 6 
months, did you participate in any education, conference or seminar that was 
totally or partly paid by your employer/your company?”
18 Those who answered 
“No” on this question would get a second question: “During the last 6 months, 
have you participated in any course, been taught by a supervisor to do new 
tasks or conducted studies on your own?” Those who answered “No” on this 
question too were recorded as not having received any staff training. Those 
who answered “Yes” on this second question got a third question: “Has your 
employer/your company paid any part of the education (any of the courses), for 
example paid for work hours used for studies, course fees, travel expenses, 
books or technical study equipment?” Those who answered “No” on this third 
question would also be recorded as not having obtained any staff training. The 
criteria for having received staff training thus include a very broad range of 
training activities, both on-the-job training and off-the-job training, which are 
partly or totally paid by the employer. Furthermore, the questions are 
formulated in such a way that mostly formal training is included in the survey. 
The informal training, such as instructions from colleagues, is not asked for 
specifically. However, informal training cannot be ruled out, since workers 
                                                      
17 The panel in the Labour force survey consists of 8 groups, where 1 group is substituted each 
quarter. The sample for the Staff training supplement consists of the first 6 groups. It follows that 
every year there will be 4 new groups (2/3) and 2 groups (1/3) will remain in the sample for two 
years. 
18 Author’s translation  
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might have recalled the informal training they received as being formal 
training. In addition, some workers were conducting studies on their own, 
which could have been of an informal nature. 
Unfortunately, there are no data on wages in the Labour force survey that 
can be matched with the observations on training. Instead, we use data on the 
wage structure from Statistical yearbook of salaries and wages 2000, published 
by Statistics Sweden. The statistics on wages in the public sector are based on 
all public employees, whereas the statistics on wages in the private sector is 
based on a sample of around 11,000 private firms.
19 The wage structure is 
reported for 71 groups of occupations in the public sector and 86 groups in the 
private sector.
20 The occupations are organized in a hierarchical framework, 
which is based on the kind of work performed and the skill and specialization 
that is required in the job.
21 First, the occupations are divided into 10 Major 
groups. Each of the ten Major groups can be divided into a number of Sub-
major groups. These Sub-major groups, in turn, are split up into several Minor 
groups. The wage-inequality statistics for 146 Minor groups of occupations 
with separate measures for men and women were matched with the individuals’ 
occupations in the Staff-training survey. The two Major groups Armed forces 
and Skilled agricultural and fishery workers were excluded from the sample 
because of too few observations.
 All self-employees were also excluded. The 
final simple size for the year 2001 used in this study is 6,376 individuals. Table 







th – for the 8 Major groups of occupations according to the SSYK 
classification. 
The percentage that participated in staff training during the last six months 
for the 8 Major groups of occupations are also presented in Table 1. It clearly 
illustrates that occupations with the highest wage inequality (Legislators, 
                                                      
19 However, the statistics is based on all employees in firms with more than 500 employees, and 
employees in the Swedish church, which was separated from the state in 2000. Among firms 
with less than 10 employees, about 3 percent where included in the survey. This implies that 
around 50 percent of the employees in the private sector were included, but only 5 percent of all 
private firms and organizations. 
20 The occupations are classified according to the Swedish Standard Classification of Occupation 
1996 (SSYK 96), which is a national adaptation of the International Standard Classification of 
Occupation (ISCO-88). 
21 It should be noted that the individuals’ occupation is based on the tasks he or she were carrying 
out at the time of data collection. Thus, the individual’s occupation need not be directly related to 
the individual’s formal education.  
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senior officials and managers [1], Professionals [2] and Technicians [3]) are 
the ones with the highest incidence of training, between 76 and 85 percent. The 
lowest training incidence has Elementary occupation [9] with 28 percent, who 
also has the lowest wage inequality. The other Major groups of occupations 
(Clerks [4], Service workers and shop sales workers [5], Craft and related 
trade workers [7], and Plant and machine operators and assemblers [8]) span 
over the mid-range between 43 and 56 percentage participation in training. The 
average number of days for those who received training follows a similar 
pattern. Occupations [1]–[3] have an average between 9 and 13 days, while the 
other occupations [4]–[9] have an average between 2 and 5 days. The higher 
incidence and intensity of training for occupations with a high wage inequality 
shown in the table is consistent with a negative relation between wage 
compression and training. However, to be able to conclude whether the relation 
is indeed negative, we have to isolate the effect of the wage structure on 
training by means of regression analysis. 
 
Table 1.  Measures of wage inequality for the year 2000 and incidence and 






















of days in 
training 
(Std dev) 
1. Legislators, senior 
officials and 
managers 
241 2.368  1.455  1.607  85  12.9 
(25.0) 
2. Professionals 1,089  1.822  1.324  1.366  82  10.3 
(24.5) 
3. Technicians 1,274  1.691  1.236  1.355  76  9.2 
(24.1) 
4. Clerks 702  1.470  1.188  1.235  56  4.6 
(17.0) 
5. Service workers and 
shop sales workers 
1,367 1.438  1.183  1.213  52  3.6 
(12.2) 
7. Craft and related 
trade workers 
692 1.488  1.221  1.218  47  3.2 
(11.2) 
8. Plant and machine 
operators, 
assemblers 




347 1.334  1.138  1.172  28  1.4 
(7.4) 
Total  6,376 1.589  1.229  1.282  61  6.14 
(18.26)  
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Note: Armed forces [0] and Skilled agricultural and fishery workers [6] were excluded 
because of too few observations. 
 
Later on in the survey, the workers who participated in training were asked: 
“Was the course/education mainly firm-specific or general?” There were three 
alternative answers: (a) “Mainly firm-specific”, (b) “Mainly general”, (c) 
“Partly firm-specific and partly general”. The respondent could mention up to 5 
training events. For each of these events, they could chose between alternatives 
a, b and c. Table 2 shows the number of individuals that answered (a) “Mainly 
firm-specific” for all training events, and how many individuals that answered 
(b) “Mainly general” for all training events. The rest of the workers who stated 
different alternatives for different courses or selected (c) “Partly firm-specific 
and partly general” have been gathered in the third category in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of general and specific training 
  N Percentage 
Mainly firm-specific  1,837 47.5   
Mainly general  704 18.2 
Partly firm-specific and 
partly general 
1,324 34.3   
Total  3,865 100 
 
Almost 50 percent stated that the education was firm-specific. This is a 
surprisingly high share. As a comparison, Regnér (2002) finds in the Level of 
living survey (LNU) that only 16 percent answered “No” on the following 
question: “Do you know other employers where you would have good use for 
what you have learned in your current job?”  Evertsson (2004), based on the 
Swedish survey of living conditions (ULF), found that during 1994 to 1998 
only 5 percent answered “No” on the following question: “Can this training 
[the latest during three years] be used with other employers?” Obviously, the 
respondents in Table 2 could have misunderstood the meaning of general 
training. It is possible that they thought of general education as something that 
was not related to their current occupation. “Mainly general” is thus a 
conservative measure of general training. 
The differences in training incidence across other categorical variables are 
illustrated in Table 3. For all individuals, the training incidence is lower in the 
private sector (56 percent) than in the public sector (69 percent). A higher share 
of the women obtains training than men. However, this is due to the fact that 
around 75 percent of the women work in the public sector while only around 25 
percent of the men do so; training is more common in the public sector. We  
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also see that people who are married or cohabitate are more likely to receive 
training. Among workers born outside the Nordic countries, only 44 percent 
receive training in the private sector and 48 percent in the public sector. 
Furthermore, it is quite clear that training incidence increases with the workers’ 
level of education. Among workers with 9-year elementary schooling or less, 
only around 40 percent obtain training.
22 Secondary school increases the 
training incidence around 20 percentage points, and college and university 
studies raises the share another 20 percentage points to around 80 percent of 
the workers. 
The employment contract should influence the training incidence, since an 
expected separation in the near future will diminish the payoff from the human-
capital investment. Consequently, in the private sector the percentage training 
for employees with open-ended contracts is twice as high as for employees 
with fixed-term contracts. The difference is slightly lower in the public sector. 
In addition, the working hours will influence the training incidence. Full-time 
employees have a higher percentage of training than part-time workers. The 
firm size, finally, increases the incidence of training.
23 Private firms with up to 
9 workers have a 35 percent incidence of training, while firms above 1000 
workers have around 70 percent.
24 Descriptive statistics of all variables can be 
found in Appendix B. 
 
                                                      
22 The 50 percent figure for Elementary less than 9 years in the public sector can be due to the 
few number of observations.  
23 See Barron, Black & Loewenstein (1987) 
24 The high share of training for smaller workplaces in the public sector can be due to the few 
number of observations in each cell.  
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Table 3. Participation in training and background characteristics, private and 
public sector 
   Percentage 
participation 
in training 










(N = 2348) 
All   60.6  55.6  69.3 
Gender Man  59.3  56.7  70.6 
 Woman  61.8  54.0  68.8 
Civil status  Single  52.3  47.6  62.0 
 Married/Cohabitate  64.2  59.4  71.9 
Place of birth  Sweden  61.6  56.4  70.5 
 Other  Nordic 
countries 
60.9 56.7  68.6 








School education  Elementary less 







 Elementary  9  years  39.6  39.4  40.2 
 Gymnasia 







 Gymnasia  more 







 College  73.2  68.1  79.4 
 University  82.0  75.6  86.4 
 Doctoral  81.1  94.1  75.0 
Employment contract  Open ended  65.4  60.1  75.0 
 Fixed  term  36.3  30.7  44.3 
Hours of work  Full time  64.9  59.7  75.8 
  Part time  








 Part  time 








Firm size         –9   36.3  36.1  66.7 
     10–49   48.4  47.8  75.0 
     50–99   53.0  51.9  67.6 
   100–249   57.4  56.1  74.4 
   250–499   63.2  61.5  78.4 
   500–999   65.8  67.3  63.0 
 1000–    69.0  68.2  69.3 
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5 The  results 
5.1  The incidence of training 
The first step in the empirical analysis is to estimate the following Probit 
model 
 
Prob[Ti = 1] = Ф[α + Xiβ + Jiγ + δki + ηgi + λWi],   (9) 
 
where Ф is the normal distribution function for the unobservable effects that 
are assumed to be captured by εi in model (7). 
The dependent variable T equals one if the individual has reported any 
training during the last six months, and zero otherwise. The independent 
variables in X include Personal characteristics: the worker’s age, a dummy 
variable for being married or cohabitating, and dummy variables for 
individuals that were born in other Nordic countries than Sweden and for those 
who were born outside the Nordic countries. The workers’ Education is 
captured by four dummy variables: Secondary school (Gymnasium) for a 
maximum of 2 years, secondary school for more than 2 years, university 
studies for less than three years, and university for 3 years or more The omitted 
reference category is elementary schooling for 9 years or less. The effects of 
the individuals’ Employment conditions are captured by the number of years at 
the present employer/firm (tenure), number of years with the present tasks 
(experience), a dummy variable for temporary employment, and a dummy 
variable for part-time. There are five dummy variables for the firm size. The 
omitted reference variable is firm size with 1,000 employees or more. 
Furthermore, there are 7 dummy variables J for the eight Major groups of 
occupations; the omitted reference variable is [9] Elementary occupations, and 
a dummy variable k for gender, which is equal to one for women. A dummy 
variable equal to one for occupation in the public sector allow different effects 
across sectors of wage compression on the incidence of training. Finally, the 
independent variables for wage inequality W is captured by the logarithms of 
the 90
th/10
th-percentage wage ratio, the 90
th/50
th-percentage wage ratio and the 
50
th/10
th-percentage wage ratio. Table 4 reports the estimated marginal effects 
on the probability to obtain training for all workers, as well as separate 
estimates for men and women in the private and public sector.  
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Table 4. Probit estimates of training probabilities, marginal effects. Robust 
















Personal characteristics        
Age
  .013**  .003 .022***  .020 .020*** 
Age
2  .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 
Married/Cohabitate  .023  .041 .027 .008 .031 
Birth other Nordic countries -.015  -.022  .061  .075  -.078 
Birth outside Nordic countries -.129*** -.146***  -.033  -.155** -.160*** 
Education        
Elementary  Reference      
Gymnasia max 2 years  .049**  .047  .033  -.070  .079** 
Gymnasia more than 2 years  .047**  .022  .075*  -.051  .070** 
College .094***  .094**  .057  -.007  .131*** 
University .115***  .089*  .045  -.024  .203*** 
Employment conditions        
Tenure 
  .009*** .013***  .011*  .012  .002 
Tenure
2  .000  .000 .000 .000 .000 
Experience
  -.014*** -.011** -.024***  -.009  -.012*** 
Experience
2  .000  .000 .001***  .000 .000 
Fixed term  -.216***  -.240*** -.145*** -.230**  -.198*** 
Part time  -.108***  -.150*** -.061**  -.231*** -.104*** 
Firm size        
- 9  -.223***  -.235***  -.231***  -.158  - 
10 – 49  -.128***  -.135***  -.143***  .022  -.043 
50 – 99  -.117***  -.063*  -.208***  -.097  -.074 
100 – 499  -.088***  -.087***  -.096***  -.145  -.012 
500 – 999  -.020  -.013  -.005  -.068  -.060 
1000 -  Reference      
Occupation        
Legislator, manager etc. .310***  .197**  .408***  .259***  .260*** 
Professionals .322***  .221** .391***  .408***  .280*** 
Technicians .309***  .212**  .359***  .266***  .305*** 
Clerks  .199***  .080 .225***  .165 .225*** 
Service workers  .187***  .134  .194***  .236***  .243*** 
Craft and trade  .151***  .092  .141  .139*  - 
Plant operators, assemblers  etc.  .115**  .074 .063 .099 - 
Elementary occupations  Reference      
Gender        
Woman  .018  - - - - 
Sector        
Public  sector  .033  - - - -  
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Table 4. (Cont.)  
Wage inequality         
Log (90 / 10) %  .049  .314***  -.131  .010  -.035 
Log (90 / 50) %  .032  .149*  -.221  -.045  -.256 
Log (50 / 10) %  .012  .418  -.102  .012  -.054 
Number of cases  6,376  2,464  1,576  568  1,764 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -3627.366  -1444.172 -936.335 -227.089 -910.598 
Pseudo R2
  .151 .143 .139  .195  .1681 
* significant at 10 % level; ** significant at 5 % level; *** significant at 1 % level. 
Note: (i)  Marginal effects on the probability to receive training are computed by evaluating the 
estimated marginal effect at every observation and then using the sample average of the 
individual effects. The effects of the dummy variables are calculated as the difference 
in probability to receive training. 
(ii) The estimates on Log (90 / 50) % and Log (50 / 10) % are based on separate Probit 
regressions, whose estimated marginal effects for the other explanatory variables are 
not reported in the table. 
(iii) Robust standard errors and adjusted for clustering on Log (90 / 10) %. 
 
Looking at the Personal characteristics, the worker’s age has a positive and 
significant effect on the incidence of training for women, while the effect on 
men is not significant.
25 For women, one additional year increases the 
probability of receiving training by 0.02. Being married or cohabitating has a 
positive but insignificant effect for both men and women.
26 Workers who were 
born in the other Nordic countries besides Sweden do not seem to have 
significantly lower probability of obtaining training. For workers born outside 
the Nordic countries, however, the effect is negative and statistically 
significant, except for women in the private sector.
27 The negative effect is 
about the same for men as for women (0.15–0.16 lower probability than 
Swedish born). When it comes to Education, women with secondary schooling 
who work in the public sector have around 0.08 higher probability to receive 
training than the reference category elementary schooling, while the effects are 
insignificant for men. A shorter period of university studies (College) and 
university studies for at least 3 years (University) increases the probability of 
                                                      
25 Workers’ age usually has a negative impact on the probability to receive training in other 
studies, see e.g. Booth (1991) and Barron, Berger & Black (1997) pp. 68–81. In Sweden, Orrje 
(2003) has found that the probability of receiving training increases with age until a maximum 
point at age 39, and then the probability decreases. Her study is however based on other data 
(The Level of living survey) than what is used in this study. 
26 Marriage is found to increase the probability of receiving training in other studies, see e.g. 
Lynch (1992). 
27 Foreign ethnicity is found to decrease the probability of receiving training in other studies as 
well, see e.g. Booth (1991), Lynch (1992) and Veum (1993).   
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obtaining training with 0.09 for men in the private sector, while the effects 0.13 
and 0.20, respectively, for women in the public sector. Thus, the effect of 
longer university studies on training is much larger for public-sector women 
than for men in the private sector. The employment conditions show that tenure 
has a positive and significant effect in the private sector (0.01 higher 
probability per year of experience).
28 Experience has a negative effect, as 
expected, for both men and women (about 0.01 lower probability per year of 
experience). Workers with temporary employment are less likely to obtain 
training (about – 0.2) than permanent employees. Part-time workers have a 
lower probability of obtaining training than full-time employees (about – 0.2 
for men and about – 0.1 for women). The firm size has a significant effect on 
the incidence of training. Workers in larger private firms have a higher 
probability of obtaining training. Workers in private firms with less than 10 
employees have about 0.2 lower probability to receiving training than workers 
in firms with 1000 employees or more. The workers occupation is shown to 
have a significant effect on training in most cases. The results clearly show that 
Legislators, senior officials and managers,  Professionals, and Technicians 
have between 0.20 and 0.40 higher probability of obtaining training than the 
reference category Elementary occupations. Clerks and Service workers have 
0.15 to 0.20 higher probability of receiving training, although the effects are 
less significant for men. Craft and related trade workers and Plant and 
machine operators and assemblers have 0.10–0.15 higher probability of 
receiving training in comparison with workers in Elementary occupations. The 
estimates in Table 4 also show that there is no isolated gender effect and no 
isolated public-sector effect on the probability of receiving training. 
The isolated effects of wage inequality on the training incidence are 
illustrated by the three final variables. For 90
th/10
th percentage wage ratio, 
higher wage inequality has a positive and significant effect on the 1-percent 
level for men in the private sector, while the effect is negative but not 
statistically significant for women in neither the private sector, nor in the public 
sector. This indicates that increasing wage compression has a negative effect 
on training for men in the private sector, but no statistically significant effect 
for women in the private sector and on all workers in the public sector. When 
                                                      
28 Tenure is often found to decrease the probability of training in other studies. The fact that both 
age and tenure increases the probability of training in Sweden could be explained by a more 
common practise to use training as a tax-deductible benefit.   
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dividing the measure of wage inequality into the two variables for the 90
th/50
th-
percentage wage ratio and the 50
th/10
th-percentage wage ratio, we see that the 
positive effect of wage inequality for men in the private sector increases for the 
50
th/10
th-ratio, but becomes statistically insignificant. The effect is smaller but 
still significant for the 90
th/50
th-percentage ratio. For women, there are negative 
but not significant effects of wage inequality on the incidence of training for 
both the upper part as well as the lower part of the wage distribution, in both 
the private and the public sector. 
These results do not change significantly when we use the alternative 








In summary, the results in Table 4 indicate that wage inequality has a 
statistically significant positive  effect on training incidence for men in the 
private sector. The effects for women and for men in the public sector, on the 
other hand, are not statistically significant. This leads to the conclusion that 
wage compression has a negative effect on the incidence of training for men in 
the private sector, which rule out the employer as the sole investor in training. 
However, we cannot find any significant effects of wage compression on the 
training incidence for women and for men in the public sector. 
 
5.2  The intensity of training 
The second part of the empirical analysis investigates the dependency between 
the number of days the workers obtained training, t, and the degree of wage 
inequality W in their occupations. From model (8) we have: 
 
ln ti = α + Xiβ + Jiγ + δki + ηgi + θGi + κSi + (λGGi + λBBi + λSSi)Wi + ui,.  (10) 
 
The dependent variable and the continuous independent variables (age, tenure, 
experience) are transformed into logarithms in order to decrease the impact of 
extreme values and to obtain estimated elasticities. To control for potential 
selection problems, equation (9) was used as a selection equation in Heckman’s 
two-stop estimation procedure. Personal characteristics (age, civil status, place 
of birth) in X were used as identifying variables that only affected the 
probability to receive training but not the number of days in training.
29 
                                                      
29 When these variables were included in the OLS regression, they had no significant effect on 
the number of days in training.  
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However, the estimated parameters did not significantly deviate from the 
parameters obtained by OLS. 
Table 5 reports the estimated percentage changes in number of days in 
training for the OLS model.
30 The estimated percentage impact from higher 
education than Elementary is 16 percent for Gymnasia max 2 years (usually 
vocational schooling).
31 The corresponding figures for Gymnasia more than 2 
years,  College and University are 13 percent, 22 percent and 27 percent, 
respectively. University education does not have significant effects for men and 
women in the private sector (column 2 and 3), but in the public sector the 
duration increases by around 75 percent. Shorter university studies (College), 
however, does have a significant effect for men in the private sector (27 
percent). 
Tenure only seems to have a significant effect for women in the public 
sector. A 10 percent increase in tenure increases the duration of training by 
about 1.7 percent. Experience, on the other hand, has a statistically significant 
and negative effect in the private sector (10 percent longer experience 
decreases training duration by 1.8 percent for men and 1.4 for women), while 
the effect is smaller or statistically insignificant in the public sector. Fixed term 
employment decreases training duration in the private sector by around 32 
percent for both men and women. Part-time employment has a larger effect on 
men than women in the private sector: 35 percent shorter duration for men 
while 11 percent for women. In the public sector, part-time decreases training 
duration for women by 29 percent while the effect is statistically insignificant 
for men. 
Work places with fewer employees than 500 have statistically shorter 
training duration in the private sector. The figures vary between 7 and 35 
percent shorter duration than for workers in firms with more than 1000 
employees. The group of occupation, finally, has statistically significant effects 
in the private sector mainly. Occupations that require higher qualifications 
(Legislator, manager etc., Professionals, Technicians) have between 50 and 
120 percent longer training duration than Elementary occupations. 
We now test whether or not the data is consistent with the hypothesis that 
follows from Proposition 1: 
                                                      
30 The Heckit estimates can be obtained upon request. 
31 The percentage impact of a dummy variable on t is calculated as e
β – 1, where β is the 
estimated parameter. See Halvorsen & Palmquist (1980) and Kennedy (1981).  
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H0: λG > 0 and λG > λB > λS, 
 
and the hypothesis that follows from Proposition 2: 
 
H0: λG < 0, or λS > λB > λG > 0. 
 
In column (1), workers who have received “mainly general” training have 
around 65 percent shorter duration than workers whose training was “partly 
firm-specific and partly general”. However, it is possible that workers who had 
longer spells of training and/or more frequent training should more often 
encounter both firm-specific and general training. The variables Gen*Log 90 / 
10 %, Both*Log 90 / 10 % and Spec*Log 90 / 10 % produce estimates of λG, λB 
and λS respectively. These estimates indicate that λG > λB > λS in columns (1)–
(4), which suggests that Proposition 1 cannot be rejected for any group, except 
for women in the public sector. However, the confidence intervals of the 
estimates intersect, which increases the probability of incorrectly accepting a 
false null hypothesis (Type II Error). Table 6 shows the probabilities that pairs 
of λG, λB, and λS are equal. 
With respect to the log (90
th/10
th) measure of wage inequality, Table 6 
reveals that λG is significantly different from zero and larger than λB for men in 
the private sector. For women in the private sector, on the other hand, λG is 
significantly different from zero and larger than λS. These results indicate that 
wage compression has a negative effect on the intensity of general training in 
the private sector. Moving on the public sector, we notice that both λG and λB 
are significantly greater than zero and greater than λS for men, while for women 
λG and λB are not significantly different from zero but λG is significantly greater 
than λB and λS. This indicates that wage compression still has a negative effect 
on the intensity of general training for men in the public sector, while the effect 
is statistically insignificant for women in the public sector. 
When splitting up the wage distribution between log (90
th/50
th) and log 
(50
th/10
th), we find that for log (50
th/10
th) the estimate of λG for men is 
significantly different from zero and greater than λS in the private sector. This 
suggests that wage compression in the lower part of the wage distribution has a 
negative effect on the intensity of general training for privately employed men. 
For women in the private sector, on the other hand, there are no statistically  
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significant effects of wage compression, which indicates that the support for 
Proposition 1 is weaker for women than for men. 
For men in the public sector, λB for log (90
th/50
th) is significantly different 
from zero and greater than λS, which implies that wage compression in the 
upper part of the wage distribution has a negative effect on the intensity of 
general training. For women in the public sector, there are still no significant 
effects on the intensity of general training. For log (50
th/10
th), we notice that λS 
is statistically significant and negative, which implies that wage compression 
has a positive effect on specific training. This finding, however, is consistent 
with both Proposition 1 and 2. 
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Table 5. OLS estimates on log of number of days in training. Robust standard 
errors and corection for dependent observations within clusters of wage 
inequality 


















Constant    1.362***  1.476***  1.206*** 1.241*** 1.272*** 
Education           
Elementary    Reference       
Gymnasia max 2 years    .151***  .141  .038 .310 .353*** 
Gymnasia more than 2 
years 
 





College    .197*** .240**  -.171  .562  .484*** 
University    .237*** .031  .100  .564**  .561*** 
Employment conditions           
Log Tenure 
    .091***  .067  .044 .005 .169*** 
Log Experience
    -.136*** -.183***  -.135**  -.091  -.078*** 
Fixed term    -.195*** -.376***  -.399***  -.025  -.028 
Part time    -.297*** -.427***  -.116*  -.201  -.347*** 
Firm  size           
- 9    -.137 -.069***  -.424***  -.253  - 
10 – 49    -.150 -.243***  -.209* -.453  .225 
50 – 99    -.116 -.226**  -.256* .118  .862 
100 – 499    -.193*** -.185***  -.357***  -.098  -.164 
500 – 999    -.057 -.176  -.119  .061  .018 
1000 -    Reference       









Professionals    .456*** .523***  .627***  -.292  .274 
Technicians    .442*** .401***  .789***  .020  .153 
Clerks    .180 .231  .289  -.324 .164 
Service workers    .080 .306**  .415**  -.172 -.197 












Reference    
  
Gender           
Woman    .-.035 -  -  -  - 
Sector            
Public sector    .065 - -  - - 
Training type           
General    -1.032*** -1.234*** -.858**  -1.107***  -1.113*** 
Specific    -.392*** -.436*  -.102  .193  -.535**  
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Table 5. (Cont.) 
Wage compression           
Gen*Log (90 / 10) %    .937***  1.302***  1.029*  2.045**  .757 
Both*Log (90 / 10) %    .184  .233  .638  1.295**  -.494 
Spec*Log (90 / 10) %    -.078  .089  -.282  .092  -.444 
Gen*Log (90 / 50) %    .416  .306  1.094  2.748  .544 
Both*Log (90 / 50) %    .128  -.298  -.021  3.214***  -.396 
Spec*Log (90 / 50) %    -.244  .158  -.263  -1.189  .023 
Gen*Log (50 / 10) %    1.352***  2.362***  1.174  1.265  .934 
Both*Log (50 / 10) %    .070  .852  1.942  -.289  -.616 
Spec*Log (50 / 10) %    -.099  -.181  .296  .249  -1.017*** 
Number of cases    3,865  1,396  851  401  1,217 
R
2   .152  .167  .196  .141  .181 
* significant at 10 % level; ** significant at 5 % level; *** significant at 1 % level. 
Note:   The estimates on Log 90 / 50 % and Log 50 / 10 % origin from separate OLS 
regressions, whose estimated parameters for the other explanatory variables are not 
reported in the table. 
 
 
Table 6. Summary of the results in Table 5 








λG = λB, λG = λS, λB = λS 
90 / 10 %  λG* >  λB  >  λS  Negative  .001   .000   .223 
90 / 50 %  λG  >  λB  >  λS  ?  .515   .128   .416 
All   
50 / 10 %  λG* >  λB  >  λS  Negative  .020   .006   .622 
90 / 10 %  λG* >  λB  >  λS  Negative  .008   .001   .703 
90 / 50 %  λG   >  λS  >  λB  ?  .445   .855   .701 
Men 
50 / 10 %  λG* >  λB  >  λS  Negative  .224   .038   .522 
90 / 10 %  λG* >  λB  >  λS  Negative  .560   .024   .111 




50 / 10 %  λB  >  λG  >  λS  ?  .798   .697   .390 
90 / 10 %  λG* >  λB*  >  λS  Negative  .378   .050   .070 
90 / 50 %  λB* >  λG  >  λS  Negative  .855   .145   .002 
Men 
50 / 10 %  λG  >  λS  >  λB  ?  .370   .539   .028 
90 / 10 %  λG  >  λS  >  λB  ?  .029   .057   .949 




50 / 10 %  λG  >  λB  >  λS*  ?  .298   .152   .747 
* = Estimates on λ reported to be statistically different from zero at 10 % level. 
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6 Concluding  remarks 
Based on data from the Swedish Labour force survey 2001 and statistics on 
wage inequality in the year 2000, this paper has found that both the incidence 
and the intensity of training in most cases are negatively related to the degree 
of wage compression. This result supports the supply-side approach to on-the-
job training, where the worker pays for and receives the payoff from general 
training. 
This result is in contrast to two recent studies that have found a positive 
relation between wage compression and training. Bassanini & Brunello (2003) 
use cross-country data within the European Union and measure wage 
compression as the differential between the median wage growth of trained and 
untrained employees. They find a negative correlation between this variable 
and incidence of general training. Almeida-Santos & Mumford (2004) use 
linked data for workplaces and employees in Britain, and use the same measure 
of wage compression as in this paper. They find that wage compression is 
positively related to both training incidence and training duration. In contrast to 
these studies, the present study cannot find any positive relation between wage 
compression and training. 
The fact that the distinction between general and specific training differs in 
the three studies might partially explain the different results. Bassanini & 
Brunello approximate general training as off-site training while specific 
training is defined as training at the workplace. Almeida-Santos & Mumford do 
not distinguish between general and specific training at all, while the present 
study use a direct question whether training was “mainly general” or “mainly 
firm-specific”.  
In addition to the problem of defining general training, there might be 
difficulties associated with the measurement of general training. The reported 
share of general training in total training is much smaller in the data set used in 
the present study than in other Swedish data sets. If general training is 
underestimated in this study and the degree of underestimation is positively 
related to the degree of wage compression, this will bias the results towards a 
negative relation between wage compression and training. 
With respect to the intensity of training, a third explanation for the 
difference in results between this and the abovementioned previous studies 
might be that the measured durations of training are shorter in this study than in 
many other European countries. For short training spells the effect on employee  
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productivity might be small. As a result, the link between the wage structure 
and the training might be quite weak. The lack of significant effects for women 
in the public sector found in this study is consistent with this explanation. 
This paper demonstrates that wage compression has different effects on 
training in the private sector and the public sector, as well as for men and for 
women. In particular, the effect of wage compression on general training seems 
to be stronger for men than for women, and training for men in the private 
sector is affected by the compression in the lower part of wage distribution 
(50
th/10
th percentile) while male training in the public sector is influenced by 
the upper wage distribution (90
th/50
th percentile). 
These results indicate that there are different mechanisms behind the 
prevalence of on-the-job training in Sweden. Accordingly, policy measures that 
are appropriate for, e.g., men in the private sector might not be beneficial in the 
public sector. How a policy system should be designed in order to meet the 
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Appendix A 
Testing the assumption of exogenous W in equation (8) 
 
The empirical model of training intensity (8) is reformulated as 
 
tit = α +Xitβ + Jitγ + δkit + ηgit + λWit + uit,     (A1) 
 
where the sub-index t stands for observation made at year 2001, and where the 
dummy variables for general and specific training in (8) have been left out. We 
suspect that Wit is an endogenous explanatory variable, and thus correlated with 
uit. Therefore we need an instrumental variable, which is correlated with Wit but 
uncorrelated with the error term uit. Wage inequality from year 2000, Wit-1, is 
found to be highly correlated with Wit. Hence we want to test if Wit-1 is 
uncorrelated with uit. If this is the case, then we conclude that Wit-1 is an 
exogenous explanatory variable that can be used directly in (8). 
Introducing an additional instrumental variable, Wit+2 (wage inequality from 
year 2003), allow us to estimate the structural model (A1) by 2SLS with Wit+2 
as the only instrumental variable and obtain estimates on uit. It is then possible 
to check if Wit-1 is uncorrelated with the estimated error term, by regressing  it u ˆ  
on all exogenous variables. The null hypothesis that both instrumental variables 
are uncorrelated with uit cannot be rejected if the obtained Sargan static 
(number of observations) × R
2 is smaller than the 5 % critical value in the Chi-
square distribution with as many degrees of freedom as there are 
overidentifying restrictions. 
This test resulted in nR
2 = 3.0712, which is smaller than the 5 % critical 
value in the Chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom, 3.84. Thus, the 
null hypothesis that Wit-1 and Wit+2 are uncorrelated with uit could not be 
rejected.  
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Appendix B 
Descriptive statics 
   Mean 
Total  
(N = 6376) 
Mean 
Private sector 
(N = 4040) 
Mean 
Public sector 
(N = 2336) 
Training participation    .61  .56  .69 
Gender Man  .48  .61  .24 
 Woman  .52  .39  .76 
Civil status  Single  .30  .32  .27 
 Married/Cohabitate  .70  .68  .73 
Place of birth  Sweden  .91  .90  .92 
 Other  Nordic 
countries 
.03 .03  .03 
























 Gymnasia  more 







 College  .15  .13  .18 
 University  .16  .10  .26 
Employment contract  Open ended  .84  .85  .81 
 Fixed  term  .16  .15  .19 
Hours of work  Full time  .76  .81  .68 
  Part time   .24  .19  .32 
Firm size         – 9   .07  .11  .00 
     10 – 49   .17  .25  .01 
     50 – 99   .07  .11  .01 
   100 – 499   .15  .21  .03 
   500 – 999   .07  .08  .07 
  1000 –   .47  .24  .87 
Class of occupation  Legislator, 
managers etc. 
.04 .04  .03 
 Professionals  .17  .12  .26 
 Technicians  .20  .20  .21 
 Clerks  .11  .14  .06 
 Service  workers    .21  .13  .37 
  Craft and trade  .11  .16  .02 
 Plant  operators, 
assemblers etc. 
.10 .16  .01 
 Elementary 
occupations 
.05 .06  .05  
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Descriptive statics (cont.) 
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